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Business Email Compromise: How the Fake Invoice Actually Works
Most owners picture a cyberattack as something dramatic: screens going dark, a ransom note, systems down. Some of the most expensive attacks on companies of 50 to 250 people look nothing like that. Nothing breaks. An email arrives that looks completely normal, someone follows its instructions, and money goes to the wrong account.
This is business email compromise, or BEC. The FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) has listed it among the costliest kinds of reported internet crime in its annual reports for years. Our post on the callback rule covers the single best defense on the payments side. This one explains how the scheme works from start to finish, so you can see where else to stop it.
Stage one: getting a foothold
A BEC scheme starts in one of two ways.
A lookalike. The criminal registers a domain that's nearly identical to yours or a vendor's, perhaps with one letter changed or a different ending, and sends email from it. At a glance, on a phone, it looks right.
A real mailbox. More effective and more common in serious cases: the criminal gets into a genuine email account, often through a phishing email that collects a password on a fake login page. The account might be yours, an employee's or one of your vendors'. Now the messages really do come from the real address.
Multi-factor authentication (MFA, the second step beyond a password) on every mailbox makes this second path much harder, which is why it's one of the most common questions on cyber-insurance applications.
Stage two: watching and waiting
This is the part most people don't expect. Once inside a mailbox, a careful criminal doesn't act right away. They read. They learn who pays which invoices, when payments go out, how people sign their emails, which vendor is due a large payment, and when the CEO will be traveling.
They often set up hidden mailbox rules, small automatic instructions that forward copies of certain emails to an outside address, or move replies out of sight so the real account owner doesn't notice the conversation. These rules can sit unnoticed for weeks.
Stage three: the request
When the timing is right, the criminal acts. The request is ordinary and plausible:
- A vendor's "accounts receivable" contact writes that they've changed banks, and attaches a letter on convincing letterhead with new details.
- An executive writes to the controller asking for an urgent, confidential wire for an acquisition or a deal.
- An employee asks HR to update their direct-deposit account before the next payroll.
- A real estate, legal or title contact sends updated wiring instructions just before a closing.
Because the criminal has been reading along, the message references real invoices, real names and real timing. Increasingly, the writing is fluent and error-free.
Stage four: the money moves
The payment goes out. Often it's only discovered when the real vendor asks, weeks later, why they haven't been paid. By then the money has usually been moved on.
Where you can stop it
The good news is that the scheme has several stages, and you can break it at any of them.
Before they get in
- MFA on every mailbox, with older sign-in methods that can't use MFA turned off.
- Training that includes realistic phishing, so staff recognize fake login pages and report them.
- Email filtering that flags messages from outside the company and from newly registered or lookalike domains.
- DMARC at enforcement on your own domains, which makes it much harder for anyone to send email pretending to be you. Our SPF, DKIM and DMARC post explains how.
While they're watching
- Alerts on new forwarding rules, especially rules that send mail outside the company. Microsoft 365 and Google Workspace both offer this; ask your IT provider to turn it on.
- Alerts on unusual sign-ins, such as logins from another country or from two distant places within an hour.
- Block automatic forwarding to outside addresses unless there's a specific, approved reason.
When the request arrives
- The callback rule: no new payee and no changed bank details without a phone call to a number already in your records.
- Two people for larger payments.
- A culture where slowing down is praised. Urgency and secrecy are the two most common features of a fraudulent request. Treat them as reasons to check, not reasons to hurry.
If money goes out
- Call your bank's fraud line immediately. Speed matters a great deal in getting a transfer stopped or recalled.
- File a complaint with IC3 at ic3.gov.
- Call your cyber insurer using the claim number on your incident plan.
- Assume the mailbox involved is compromised until IT confirms otherwise: reset the password, sign out all sessions and check for forwarding rules.
Your vendors are part of this
When I ran IT at a company of about 200 people, the BEC attempts that worried me most weren't aimed at us directly. They came through vendors whose own mailboxes had been taken over, so the messages arrived from real, trusted addresses. No filter would flag them. The only thing that worked every time was the process: a callback to a number we already had.
That works in both directions. If one of your mailboxes is compromised, your customers may be the ones who get the fake invoice. DMARC protects against forgery, but only MFA and monitoring protect against a real account being taken over.
What to do Monday morning
- Confirm MFA is required on every mailbox, including shared mailboxes and executives', with older sign-in methods blocked.
- Ask IT to turn on alerts for new forwarding rules and unusual sign-ins, and to block automatic forwarding to outside addresses.
- Confirm the callback rule is in writing and followed for new payees, bank-detail changes and payroll changes.
- Add your bank's fraud line and the IC3 website to your one-page incident plan.
- Tell your finance and HR teams, in person, that urgency and secrecy in a payment request are reasons to slow down, and that you'll back them when they do.